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Note 
 
Striking Before the Well Goes Dry: Exploring if 
and How the United States Ban on Crude Oil 
Exports Should Be Lifted To Exploit the 
American Oil Boom 
Sam Andre* 
On December 22, 1975, with the 1973 Arab oil embargo‘s 
painful images of high energy prices and seemingly endless gas 
station lines still lingering in the minds of the U.S. population, 
President Gerald Ford proclaimed the passing of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).1 Congress and the Presi-
dent enacted the EPCA to alleviate fears of a future energy cri-
sis by promoting American energy independence through the 
conservation of domestic resources,2 the design of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve,3 and the banning of American crude oil ex-
ports.4 To police the export ban, the President delegated au-
thority through the Export Administration Regulation (EAR) to 
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), a part of the De-
partment of Commerce (DOC). This agency was tasked with a 
duty to rule on any oil export applications.5 As domestic oil 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright 
© 2015 by Sam Andre. 
 1. President Gerald R. Ford, Statement on the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (Dec. 22, 1975), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5452 
(―The single most important energy objective for the United States today is to 
resolve our internal differences and put ourselves on the road toward energy 
independence. It is in that spirit that I have decided to sign the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act.‖). 
 2. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(4) (2012) (stat-
ing the purpose of the EPCA). 
 3. Id. § 6201(2) (creating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to reduce the 
effects of energy supply interruptions).  
 4. Id. § 6212(a)(1) (allowing the President to restrict exports of oil as 
deemed appropriate and necessary).  
 5. Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b)(1) (2015) (―BIS 
will approve applications to export crude oil for the following kinds of transac-
tions if BIS determines that the export is consistent with the specific require-
ments pertinent to that export.‖). 
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production declined after 1975, these provisions shielded Amer-
ican energy interests by fulfilling President Ford‘s goal of 
providing a ―foundation upon which we can build. [sic] together 
toward our goal of energy independence.‖6 
New technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing, recently 
caused a substantial boom in oil production, raising production 
by one million barrels per day in 2012.7 This growth in produc-
tion directly prompted the need for a timely solution to the 
growing issue of whether and how the EPCA‘s oil export ban 
can be lifted to capitalize on this newly found resource before 
production or foreign demand for American oil sours. Support-
ers of terminating the ban point to potential profits from ex-
porting light crude oil to foreign markets and decreased gas 
prices.8 In opposition, environmentalists and isolationists warn 
of risks to the environment and energy independence.9 Moreo-
ver, disagreement continues on how the federal government 
could legally lift the ban, whether through executive branch in-
terpretation of the ECPA and the EAR or congressional ac-
tion.10 This issue particularly necessitates a swift solution due 
to growing uncertainty after the DOC resurrected the issue by 
 
 6. Ford, supra note 1.  
 7. See Mark J. Perry, Growing Oil Output Means US Should End Export 
Ban, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (June 18, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/ 
growing-oil-output-means-us-should-end-export-ban (―In 2012, U.S. oil produc-
tion grew by 1 million barrels a day—faster than in any other country in the 
world.‖). See generally Sean T. Dixon & Jonathan Panico, Extraction for Ex-
portation: Is There Such a Thing as “Net Energy Independence”?, 27 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV‘T 38, 38 (2013) (chronicling the rise in crude oil production 
through onshore and offshore programs).  
 8. See Perry, supra note 7 (―This surge in energy production has created 
hundreds of thousands of jobs, pumped tens of billions of dollars into the econ-
omy and given new life to American manufacturing . . . .‖); Jim Snyder, Lifting 
Oil Export Ban Would Cut Gas Price, Columbia Study Shows, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-16/lifting-oil 
-export-ban-would-cut-gas-price-columbia-study-shows (stating that U.S. gas 
prices would fall as much as twelve cents per gallon by lifting the ban). 
 9. See Letter from Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator, to Barack Obama, 
U.S. President (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and 
-events/press/menendez-to-obama-expanding-crude-exports-only-enhances-big 
-oil-profits (arguing that domestic oil should not be exported). 
 10. Compare Elana Schor, End of Crude Export Ban Rockets from Incon-
ceivable to Possible, E & E PUB. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/ 
1059992476 (exploring how to legally lift the ban), with Letter from Edward 
Markey, U.S. Senator, and Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator, to Barack Obama, 
U.S. President (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
2014-1-30_Obama_oil_exports.pdf (arguing against proposed avenues for lift-
ing the ban). 
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granting limited exportation rights to Pioneer Natural Re-
sources and Enterprise Products Partners in 2014.11  
This Note proposes that, due to the recent rise in domestic 
oil production, the federal government should lift the EPCA‘s 
oil export ban. Part I describes the passage and provisions of 
the EPCA and other relevant regulatory measures, how these 
standards regulate the exportation of crude oil, and how this 
export issue arose. Part II compares and contrasts previously 
proposed arguments for and against lifting the ban. Part II also 
analyzes the available government actions to resolve this ex-
port issue. Part III proposes a President-initiated solution that 
includes multiple countermeasures to combat the negative ef-
fects of increased oil exports. This Note concludes that the 
President should set new licensing rules approving crude oil 
exports, so long as exporters provide fixed funding levels for re-
newable energy projects and meet environmental sustainability 
regulations. Such a system allows American oil producers to 
utilize excess domestic crude oil while protecting the global en-
vironment and U.S. energy independence. Also, the federal 
government should promote the modification or creation of re-
fineries to better utilize domestically produced light crude oil. 
These changes allow for increased American use of light crude 
that present refinery capacities do not permit, fulfilling the 
EPCA‘s policy of promoting U.S. energy independence.  
I.  REGULATING THE EXPORT OF DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL   
This Part describes the current legal framework for deter-
mining when American crude oil producers may export crude 
oil. Section A presents the pertinent provisions of the EPCA 
and the EAR controlling the exportation of oil. Section B illus-
trates how the issue of changing these export regulations sur-
faced due to increases in light crude oil production from the ad-
vent of hydraulic fracturing. Section B also cites recent 
allowances of significant oil exports and previously suggested 
ways for the federal government to address this export issue. 
 
 
 
 11. Christian Berthelsen & Lynn Cook, U.S. Ruling Loosens Four-Decade 
Ban on Oil Exports, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ 
u-s-ruling-would-allow-first-shipments-of-unrefined-oil-overseas-1403644494 
(discussing the most recent granting of export powers by the Department of 
Commerce). 
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A. CRUDE OIL EXPORT REGULATIONS 
After OPEC‘s 1973 oil embargo halted essential U.S. oil 
imports and caused the price of a barrel of oil to skyrocket from 
$18 to over $40,12 Congress enacted the EPCA to protect the 
U.S. economy from foreign oil volatility.13 This legislation in-
tended  
to strengthen national energy security by reducing dependence on 
imported oil . . . to reduce the air, water, and other environmental 
impacts . . . of energy production, distribution, transportation, and 
utilization, through the development of an environmentally sustaina-
ble energy system . . . [and] to consider the comparative environmen-
tal and public health impacts of the energy to be produced or saved by 
the specific activities.14 
Of particular importance, Congress planned to use the 
EPCA ―to conserve energy supplies through energy conserva-
tion programs, and, where necessary, the regulation of certain 
energy uses.‖15 This regulation of energy uses included the re-
striction of American crude oil exports, allowing the President 
to ―by rule, under such terms and conditions as he determines 
to be appropriate and necessary to carry out the purposes of 
this chapter, restrict exports of . . . petroleum products . . . .‖16  
Although the EPCA effectively prohibits unlicensed exports 
of crude oil through this presidential restriction power, the 
President may exempt exports from the restriction that he de-
termines to be within ―the national interest and the purposes of 
this chapter.‖17 Any exemptions granted will be subsequently 
included in the rule or provided in an amendment to the EP-
CA.18 The EPCA authorizes the President to grant exemptions 
based on the purpose for export, the country of destination, or 
any other reasonable basis deemed consistent with the national 
 
 12. See Ian McCabe, Achieving U.S. Energy Autonomy: The Problems, So-
lutions and Side Effects of Weaning the American Economy Off Foreign Oil, 3 
APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 169, 171 (2009) (discussing the vulnera-
bility of the American economy caused by reliance on volatile foreign oil ex-
ports, specifically citing the 1973 OPEC oil embargo as an example).  
 13. Id. at 182 (―During the subsequent Ford Administration, in 1975, 
Congress enacted the Energy Conservation and Production Act and the Ener-
gy Policy and Conservation Act.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 14. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 2001, 106 Stat. 2776, 
3057 (1992). 
 15. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(4) (2012). 
 16. Id. § 6212(a).  
 17. Id. § 6212(b)(1).  
 18. Id. § 6212(b)(2) (describing how the President decides to provide an 
exemption to the oil exportation prohibition). 
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interest.19 When taking into account the national interest for 
exempting exports, the President considers, at a minimum, 
whether exporting oil would diminish the quality and quantity 
of oil available to the U.S., any existing environmental reviews 
on the effects of this oil on the environment, or whether export-
ing oil would cause oil supply shortages or sustained oil prices 
significantly higher than world market levels.20 
In 1981, the D.C. Circuit interpreted various EPCA presi-
dential powers in American Federation of Government Employ-
ees v. Carmen. In that case, the court found that the EPCA em-
powers the President to respond to energy crises through such 
tools as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but this authority is 
subject to limits.21 Specifically, any contingency plans created 
by the President in response to energy crises may not run long-
er than nine months, must gain approval from both houses of 
Congress, cannot include any rationing or taxes, nor propose 
any provisions on the price of petroleum products.22 Also, any 
new law regarding American energy, even in the short term, 
must be generated through the traditional legislative process.23 
The court concluded the EPCA provisions augment existing 
presidential power, leaving unaltered any previous congres-
sionally accorded executive authority.24 
To implement presidential regulatory power granted under 
the EPCA, the EAR delegated oil export license determinations 
to BIS.25 Under these regulations, a license is required for ex-
 
 19. Id. 
 20. 15 C.F.R. § 754 (2015) (providing minimum review requirements for 
the President on when exportation of oil is within the national interest).  
 21. Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 823–24 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (analyzing and interpreting the EPCA‘s grant of presidential powers). 
 22. Id. at 824 (providing limits to the President‘s EPCA contingency pow-
ers).  
 23. Id. (―New law in these areas, even for a short term, must be made 
through the regular legislative process.‖). 
 24. Id. at 825 (―Signalling [sic] that the EPCA does not repeal other laws 
by sweeping within its governance all federal attempts to curtail prodigal use 
of energy, the Act calls upon the President to exercise his authority ‗under 
other law‘ to develop standards with respect to energy efficiency in Govern-
ment procurement policies and decisions.‖). 
 25. Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2015) (―The 
EAR are issued by the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of In-
dustry and Security (BIS) under laws relating to the control of certain exports, 
reexports, and activities.‖). For information on BIS and its underlying goals 
and responsibilities, see Mission Statement, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECU-
RITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/mission-statement (last visit-
ed Nov. 2, 2015). 
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porting crude oil to any foreign destination, defining crude oil 
―as a mixture of hydrocarbons that existed in liquid phase in 
underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric 
pressure after passing through surface separating facilities and 
which has not been processed through a crude oil distillation 
tower.‖26 BIS approves export applications if it determines that 
the export is in line with the President‘s findings under an ap-
plicable statute,27 or if it determines that the export is ―con-
sistent with the national interest and the purposes of the Ener-
gy Policy and Conservation Act.‖28  
Under this second prong of consideration, BIS reviews ap-
plications on a case-by-case basis and assumes the following 
transactions to be within the national interest and the EPCA‘s 
purposes: transactions directly resulting in equal or greater 
levels of oil imports of equal or better quality; transactions 
through contracts able to be terminated if U.S. petroleum sup-
plies are interrupted or seriously threatened; or transactions 
for which the applicant demonstrates that, ―for compelling eco-
nomic or technological reasons that are beyond the control of 
the applicant, the crude oil cannot reasonably be marketed in 
the United States.‖29 In practice, the BIS used this process to 
approve limited amounts of oil exports to China, Costa Rica, 
France, South Korea, and Mexico, while also allowing substan-
tial exports to Canada.30  
In addition to these BIS determinations, regulations re-
quire export license applicants to meet multiple procedural 
conditions. For instance, only a U.S. exporter may apply for an 
 
 26. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(a) (2015).  
 27. Id. § 754.2(b)(1) (listing exports that are consistent with presidential 
findings under an applicable statute, including exports to Canada, or exports 
from Alaska‘s Cook Inlet).  
 28. Id. § 754.2(b)(2). 
 29. Id. §§ 754.2(b)(2)(i)(A)–(C). For a brief overview of the export licensing 
process, see CTR. FOR ENERGY ECON., EXPORT REGULATIONS: WHAT YOU NEED 
TO KNOW 1 (2013), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/CEE_Exploring% 
20Export%20Controls.pdf. 
 30. See January 2013 Crude Oil Export to China Was a Rare Event, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail 
.cfm?id=10851 (exploring BIS approved oil export levels in 2013); see also 
Memorandum from the Cong. Research Serv. to the Senate Energy and Nat. 
Res. Comm. 1 (Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum on Export Licenses], 
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=73e6832f 
-9670-445b-b8c5-9b254d9f5bca (―[B]etween fiscal year 2008 (10/2007–9/2008) 
and August 2013, 338 export license applications have been received by BIS of 
which 304 have been approved. All export licenses aside from those for Canada 
were for foreign-origin crude oil.‖).  
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export license.31 Also, an entity files a license application elec-
tronically, registering the application on the BIS Simplified 
Network Application Process Redesign (SNAP-R).32 When reg-
istered, the applicant lists the ―exporter, consignee, the volume 
of the export and its monetary value, a description of the prod-
uct, its end-use, and a certification of origin for the product.‖33 
BIS follows license application procedures promulgated under 
Executive Order 12,981, requiring BIS to determine the status 
of an application within 30 days.34 A license expires after one 
year and is non-transferable by the receiver.35 If an export ap-
plication meets these procedural requirements, along with ful-
filling the above-mentioned EPCA and EAR substantive condi-
tions, the applicant receives an export license. 
In essence, the EPCA bans exports of domestically pro-
duced oil in response to previous oil market volatility. The 
statute allows limited exceptions to the ban if the requesting 
party passes BIS procedures. When granting a license, BIS 
must find the purpose of the requested license to be within the 
national interest, the purposes of the EPCA, or other reasona-
ble bases. In addition, applicants must complete other proce-
dural requirements such as application registration to be con-
sidered for an exception. If an applicant meets these 
administrative requirements, the President may grant the par-
ty an export license. Overall, this process promotes the purpos-
es of the EPCA by stockpiling domestic oil through limitations 
on its sale to foreign entities. 
 
 
 31. See PHILLIP BROWN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43442, U.S. 
CRUDE OIL EXPORT POLICY: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS 9 (2014), 
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=dfe108c9 
-cef6-43d0-9f01-dc16e6ded6b4 (discussing the role of BIS in export licensing 
and regulation).  
 32. Id. For detailed background information on SNAP-R access and regis-
tration, see Simplified Network Application Process - Redesign (SNAP-R), BU-
REAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/ 
licensing/simplified-network-application-process-redesign-snap-r (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2015).  
 33. BROWN ET AL., supra note 31.  
 34. Exec. Order No. 12,981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,983 (1995) (―Within 30 days of 
receipt of a referral and all required information, a department or agency shall 
provide the Secretary with a recommendation either to approve or deny the 
license application.‖).  
 35. BROWN ET AL., supra note 31. 
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B. OCCURRENCES GIVING RISE TO THE EPCA EXPORT  
REGULATION REVISION ISSUE 
Although the EPCA succeeded in alleviating fears of for-
eign oil uncertainty immediately after its enactment, recent 
developments in American oil exploration and production raise 
questions regarding this law‘s continued need. In 1970, U.S. oil 
production reached its peak, producing approximately 9.6 mil-
lion barrels per day.36 After this climax, U.S. oil production 
continuously declined due to the drying-up of domestic wells, 
reaching a new low of 5 million barrels produced per day in 
2005.37 However, recent technological advances, such as hy-
draulic fracturing, increased onshore and offshore oil produc-
tion and subsequently resurrected domestic production to 7.44 
million barrels per day in 2013.38 With new pockets of oil com-
ing under production, potentially including 58 billion barrels of 
recoverable shale oil,39 over the next five years American crude 
oil production could grow by another three million barrels per 
day.40  
The type of oil being produced raises additional concerns 
pertinent to the export issue. Specifically, increased production 
consists mainly of ultra-light oil largely unfit for domestic 
use.41 Crude oil is produced through the combination of many 
 
 36. See U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET& 
s=MCRFPUS2&f=A (providing an interactive graph showing the levels of U.S. 
crude oil production since 1859). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Dixon & Panico, supra note 7 (―The years 2009 and 2010 saw 
highest ever offshore production levels of offshore crude, even with the tempo-
rary moratorium put in place after the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The per-
centage of offshore crude oil leases in water deeper than 200 meters has risen 
from just over 17 percent in 1992 to 76 percent in 2007, a huge increase in just 
fifteen years.‖). 
 39. For general information on shale oil, see Oil Shale, INST. FOR ENERGY 
RES., http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/topics/encyclopedia/oil-shale (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015).  
 40. See Perry, supra note 7. 
 41. See Increases in U.S. Crude Oil Production Come from Light, Sweet 
Crude from Tight Formations, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16591 (overviewing the out-
pacing of light crude oil production over medium and heavy crude oil produc-
tion); see also Blake Clayton, The Case for Allowing U.S. Crude Oil Exports, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 8, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oil/case-allowing 
-us-crude-oil-exports/p31005 (analyzing the viability of domestically-produced 
light crude oil accessed through fracturing). For a discussion on the differences 
between types of crude oil and information on their production, see U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION FORECAST-ANALYSIS OF 
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different compounds, including hydrogen and carbon, with each 
site of production using different combinations of compounds 
that influence the produced oil‘s characteristics.42 Oil density, 
the substance‘s density relative to water, is one such character-
istic, with light crude having a light density and heavy crude 
having a heavy density.43 Simple refineries process light crude 
into such products as gasoline and jet fuel, while denser crude 
tends to be refined for more premium products sold for different 
purposes and requiring more complex refineries and equip-
ment.44 Due to these significant differences in light and heavy 
crude, producers must decide whether to pump the currently 
abundant light crude or leave it in the ground since it tends to 
come ―from either areas where refiners are not interested in or 
able to process it . . . or in parts of the country with inadequate 
transportation infrastructure.‖45 With conversion of U.S. refin-
eries from primarily heavy crude capabilities to light crude ca-
pabilities being cost prohibitive,46 and light crude production 
projected to outpace heavier crude,47 producers are calling for 
increased oil exports to take economic advantage of growing 
light crude reserves otherwise going unused.  
In addition to the rise in light crude oil production, signifi-
cant previous export grants question the export system‘s con-
tinued legitimacy. In 1996, President Bill Clinton lifted the ban 
on exporting Alaskan North Slope crude oil after determining 
that it would ―contribute to economic growth, reduce depend-
ence on imported oil, and create new jobs for American work-
 
CRUDE TYPES 2 (May 29, 2014). 
 42. JASON BORDOFF & TREVOR HOUSER, COLUMBIA CTR. ON GLOB. ENER-
GY POLICY, NAVIGATING THE U.S. OIL EXPORT DEBATE 22–23 (2015), http:// 
energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/Navigating%20the% 
20US%20Oil%20Export%20Debate_January%202015.pdf (explaining the 
chemical make-up of light crude oil and why it is different from heavy crude).  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 23.  
 45. Clayton, supra note 41. Light crude oil has different quality character-
istics from medium or heavy crude oil, leading to different uses. See Crude 
Oils Have Different Quality Characteristics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 
16, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7110 (providing an 
overview of the differences in types of crude oil and how those differences af-
fect their uses). 
 46. BORDOFF & HOUSER, supra note 42, at 8 (―Processing LTO in a refin-
ery optimized for heavy crudes changes the mix of products produced (e.g., 
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and fuel oil) and can reduce overall refinery sales 
revenue. Building new refineries to process domestic LTO takes both time and 
money.‖). 
 47. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION FORECAST, 
supra note 41. 
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ers.‖48 President Clinton ruled this lifting to be within the na-
tional interest, as these oil exports would not diminish the 
amount of oil available to the United States, cause sustained oil 
supply shortages or oil price increases, nor pose a significant 
risk to the environment.49 In 2008, President George W. Bush 
lifted a presidential moratorium on drilling for oil on the Outer 
Continental Shelf, after concluding that such drilling could lead 
to ―a decade‘s worth of oil for the United States, and that ex-
ploiting it could be done unobtrusively, without damaging coral 
reefs or creating spills.‖50 Also, the U.S. annually allows sub-
stantial light crude exports to Canada,51 fulfilling trade agree-
ments between both nations.52 The DOC continues to follow 
this trend of granting exceptions and export licenses, granting 
304 such licenses between fiscal year 2008 and August 2013.53  
In light of these trends in oil production and exportation, 
advocates and detractors of modifying the EPCA suggest vari-
ous federal actions to solve the export issue. First, the Presi-
dent could act through EPCA granted powers by interpreting 
 
 48. President Bill Clinton, Statement on Exports of Alaska North Slope 
Crude Oil (Apr. 28, 1996), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1996-05-06/ 
pdf/WCPD-1996-05-06-Pg747.pdf; see also Clinton Lifts Ban on Alaskan Oil 
Exports, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/29/us/ 
clinton-lifts-ban-on-alaskan-oil-exports.html (summarizing President Clinton‘s 
lifting of the Alaskan crude oil export ban).  
 49. Clinton, supra note 48 (offering President Clinton‘s reasoning for al-
lowing the exportation of Alaskan North Slope Oil). In addition to lifting the 
ban on Alaskan oil exports, President Clinton also increased the export of oil 
to Canada through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See 
North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (2012) (approving 
U.S. entrance into NAFTA); Sarah Bridges, American Trade News Highlights 
for Spring, 2013, the Keystone XL: To Choose Economic Triumph, or Environ-
mental Disaster?, 19 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 263, 264 (2013) (discussing the 
trade of oil between Canada and the U.S. under NAFTA); Alastair R. Lucas, 
Canada’s Role in the United States’ Oil and Gas Supply Security: Oil Sands, 
Arctic Gas, NAFTA, and Canadian Kyoto Protocol Impacts, 25 ENERGY L.J. 
403, 421 (2004) (analyzing NAFTA provisions on the energy trade).  
 50. Steven Lee Myers & Carl Hulse, Bush Lifts Drilling Moratorium, 
Prodding Congress, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/14/washington/14drillcnd.html?; see also McCabe, supra note 12, at 
187. Any oil exported from the Outer Continental Shelf must follow the re-
quirements of the Export Administration Act. To view these restrictions, see 
Export Administration Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1354 (2012). 
 51. See January 2013 Crude Oil Export to China Was a Rare Event, supra 
note 30 (―From 2003 to 2012, the United States exported an average of 35,000 
bbl/d of crude oil—98% of those exports were delivered to Canada.‖). 
 52. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement § 3312 (describing 
the relationship of the agreement to U.S. and state law); Lucas, supra note 49 
(discussing energy import and export regulations under NAFTA). 
 53. Memorandum on Export Licenses, supra note 30. 
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exports to be or not be in the national interest.54 Second, the 
U.S. Congress could amend or pass a new law taking into ac-
count the nation‘s recent energy developments.55 Third, the BIS 
can approve additional exports by using the EAR loophole of 
finding there to be compelling economic or technological rea-
sons why the oil cannot be marketed in the U.S.56 With such 
options, the federal government could simply stick with the sta-
tus quo.57 As Part II demonstrates, each of these alternatives 
provides various benefits and detriments that ultimately decide 
their potential effectiveness in solving the EPCA oil export ban 
issue. 
Overall, the EPCA and EAR create a comprehensive sys-
tem of oil export restrictions and exceptions. Unless the execu-
tive branch concludes an export is within the national interest, 
or falls within a predetermined category of allowed exports, a 
proposed license or exception will be denied. Specifically, an 
applicant must prove to the BIS, by following proper adminis-
trative procedures, that its application fits within the agency‘s 
definition of a national interest in order to be an accepted ex-
portation. Such stringent regulations promote the EPCA‘s goals 
of protecting American energy independence, conserving do-
mestic resources, and preventing additional risks to the envi-
ronment. Yet, due to increases in oil production and past export 
license grants, the issue arises regarding whether the export 
ban should be lifted, a topic explored fully in Part II.  
II.  RELEVANT ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
REVISING THE EXPORT BAN   
This Part presents existing arguments for and against re-
vising the EPCA‘s export ban. Section A examines previously 
promoted economic, procedural, and trade reasons for undoing 
the EPCA oil export prohibition. Section B provides contrary 
bases provided by export detractors for why the federal gov-
 
 54. See Brad Plumer, U.S. Oil Exports Have Been Banned for 40 Years. Is 
It Time for That To Change?, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/08/u-s-oil-exports-have-been 
-banned-for-40-years-is-it-time-for-that-to-change (analyzing proposals for 
modifying or lifting the EPCA export ban). 
 55. Id.  
 56. 15 C.F.R. §§ 754.2(b)(2)(i)(A)–(C) (2015). 
 57. See Sarah O. Ladislaw, The Molecule Laws: History and Future of the 
Crude Export Ban, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT‘L STUD. (Jan. 2, 2014), http:// 
csis.org/publication/molecule-laws-history-and-future-crude-export-ban (ana-
lyzing various options of addressing the EPCA export ban issue). 
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ernment should not modify the export ban. Such bases include 
negative economic, environmental, and security reasons why 
the federal government should not allow increased oil exports. 
Section C analyzes available and previously submitted execu-
tive and legislative solutions to the export issue. Overall, these 
positions and potential solutions present valid grounds for the 
federal government to consider when making its final oil export 
decision. 
A. ARGUMENTS FOR LIFTING THE EPCA EXPORT BAN 
According to oil export supporters, lifting the EPCA export 
ban presents numerous potential benefits to the United States. 
First, allowing greater amounts of exports could provide eco-
nomic gains such as a decline in gas prices and increased job 
growth. Second, escalating exports now follows recent trends in 
allowing U.S. producers to sell oil abroad. Third, allowing ex-
ports of the light crude oil being produced utilizes an otherwise 
domestically unusable resource. Fourth, increasing sales of 
U.S. oil abroad grows the nation‘s influence within foreign oil 
markets, thus strengthening its global influence. Overall, these 
benefits provide authoritative support for lifting the EPCA ex-
port ban. 
1. Increasing Exports Provides Oil Price, Job, and Investment  
Benefits  
Various economic advantages constitute one category of 
reasons supporting EPCA modifications. For instance, allowing 
American oil producers to sell light crude oil abroad could lead 
to a decline in domestic gas prices of ―as much as 12 cents a gal-
lon.‖58 Such effects begin with drops in crude oil prices, as seen 
in 2014 when crude oil prices decreased from $96.54 in August 
to $59.29 in December.59 These advantageous effects of in-
creased exports stem from American light crude exports satu-
rating the global oil market and consequently decreasing oil 
and gas prices.60 Increasing oil exports could also strengthen 
 
 58. Snyder, supra note 8.  
 59. Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http:// 
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=M (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 60. Clayton, supra note 41 (―Prices at the pump will continue to be deter-
mined by the global market, regardless of whether the United States exports 
crude oil. Were the ban overturned today, crude exports would immediately 
rise by several billion dollars a year . . . .‖). But see infra Part II.B.1 for a dis-
cussion regarding the potential increase in domestic oil and gas prices due to 
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domestic oil manufacturing and consequently boost American 
job growth.61 As access to foreign markets likely motivates U.S. 
companies to invest in oil and gas production in order to in-
crease supply, these producers expect to hire more workers to 
generate larger quotas.62 Due to such market reactions, propo-
nents of exports project that ―every $1 billion drop in the U.S. 
trade imbalance thanks to stronger energy sales could create as 
many as 5,000 jobs.‖63  
2. Increasing Exports Follows Recent Trend in American Oil  
Sales Abroad 
Along with these economic benefits, current EPCA excep-
tions demonstrate a substantial trend towards allowing in-
creased sales of U.S. oil abroad and could suggest that further 
exports would follow this development. Although the U.S. ex-
ported only 20,000 to 40,000 barrels of oil per day in the early 
2000s, in 2013 exports skyrocketed to between 100,000 and 
130,000 barrels per day.64 Export levels were projected to in-
crease further to approximately 200,000 barrels per day.65 
Canada imports a majority of this American oil under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which pro-
vides various incentives and regulations for energy trading be-
tween the United States, Canada, and Mexico.66 These exports 
include 25,000 barrels per day of California heavy oil, 50,000 
barrels per day of Alaskan North Slope oil, and significant 
 
increased export levels. 
 61. See Schor, supra note 10 (―One theory is that the U.S. should use it as 
a competitive advantage, to revive our manufacturing sector . . . .‖). 
 62. Clayton, supra note 41 (―Letting drillers reap extra profits from selling 
crude oil overseas . . . would also encourage investment in oil and gas produc-
tion in the United States rather than abroad. In oil-producing regions, more 
workers would be hired for oil exploration and production.‖); Schor, supra note 
10 (―[C]ompanies likely would have a greater incentive to increase production  
. . . .‖). 
 63. Schor, supra note 10. 
 64. LORNE STOCKMAN, SHOULD IT STAY OR SHOULD IT GO?: THE CASE 
AGAINST U.S. CRUDE OIL EXPORTS 22 (2013), http://priceofoil.org/content/  
uploads/2013/10/OCI_Stay_or_Go_FINAL.pdf (―[I]n February 2013, crude oil 
exports suddenly doubled and have hovered between 100,000 and 130,000 b/d 
since.‖); Clayton, supra note 41 (―Crude oil exports have grown from next to 
nothing in 2007 to around one hundred thousand barrels per day in March 
2013, all of which went to Canada.‖). 
 65. STOCKMAN, supra note 64.  
 66. For information on NAFTA and energy trading under its provisions, 
see North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (2012) (describ-
ing the relationship of the agreement to U.S. and state law); Lucas, supra note 
49 (discussing energy import and export regulations under NAFTA).  
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amounts of Alaskan Cook Inlet oil.67 BIS supported this selling 
of oil by increasing its issuance of export licenses to 66 in 2012, 
after issuing only 45 in 2011 and 22 in 2007.68 Overall, this ev-
idence could suggest that lifting EPCA‘s export ban may be an 
acceptable evolution of the recent trend in oil exports. Also, 
these substantial exports may imply that any negative effects 
of escalating energy sales would be insignificant, as current ex-
port levels do not threaten American society or oil security.  
3. Increasing Exports Utilizes Otherwise Unusable Light  
Crude Oil 
As discussed earlier,69 allowing producers to export the 
light crude now being produced takes advantage of this plenti-
ful yet domestically unusable resource.70 With an oil-refining 
infrastructure currently incapable of using light crude, produc-
ers of this oil remain unable to sell most of their product within 
the U.S.71 When producers can actually sell light crude within 
the U.S., they do so at depressed prices, potentially making it 
more profitable to leave the oil unused in the ground.72 In place 
of this lack of profits, allowing light crude sales in foreign mar-
kets could enable producers to generate $15 billion per year by 
2017.73 Also, selling the oil abroad to be refined likely proves 
cheaper for domestic consumers than retooling U.S. refineries 
originally made to refine heavier crude.74 Finally, allowing ex-
 
 67. STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 21 (listing acceptable U.S. oil exports 
under current executive and administrative regulations).  
 68. Id. at 23. 
 69. See supra Part I.B. 
 70. See Conway Irwin, Without Exports, US Could Face Oil Supply Glut 
in 2015, BREAKING ENERGY (Dec. 17, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://breakingenergy 
.com/2013/12/17/without-exports-us-could-face-oil-supply-glut-in-2015 (―A lot 
of what is coming out of the Eagle Ford shale—maybe a third of the incremen-
tal growth of around 1MM bbl/d over the last couple years—has been in the 
form of lease condensate . . . .‖). 
 71. See Clayton, supra note 41 (discussing the sale of light crude oil with-
in the U.S.).  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. (―Crude oil exports could generate upward of $15 billion a year in 
revenue by 2017 at today‘s prices, according to industry estimates.‖). 
 74. Emily Pickrell, ConocoPhillips Chief Pushes for U.S. Oil Exports, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/  
business/eagle-ford-energy/article/ConocoPhillips-chief-pushes-for-U-S-oil 
-exports-4994572.php. Asian, European, Latin American, and Canadian mar-
kets already serve as outlets for American light crude. These markets have the 
capacity to import more American oil resulting from increased U.S. produc-
tion. Irwin, supra note 70 (―All of those outlets have room to grow, to take this 
glut, to not have to see acute constraints for the next year . . . .‖). 
ANDRE_4fmt 1/3/2016 1:06 PM 
2015] STRIKING BEFORE THE WELL GOES DRY 777 
 
ports probably does not threaten U.S. oil supplies due to light 
crude being domestically unusable and increased sales likely 
leading to greater production and supplies.75 If an energy 
emergency arises, the federal government could suspend ex-
ports and use these increased oil stores,76 but otherwise pro-
ducers make profits by producing substantial oil for domestic 
needs and then selling excess product abroad.  
4. Increasing Exports Strengthens American Influence Abroad 
In addition to each of these benefits, allowing increased oil 
exports could enhance American influence in the global energy 
market due to its growing status as an oil seller. Consequently, 
this position could bolster American negotiation positions on 
other trade issues, as the U.S. would be a more powerful party 
due to its oil sales and its proven willingness to deal with for-
eign entities on the politically sensitive issue of oil.77 Also, by 
promoting the sale of American oil to foreign countries or enti-
ties, the federal government may demonstrate a commitment to 
free trade.78 This commitment could additionally improve or 
maintain positive relationships with foreign allies by trading 
American oil to those wanting to fulfill their energy needs with 
American oil.79  
Overall, many reasons exist for lifting or modifying the 
EPCA export ban. Permitting increased exports may lead to 
economic benefits for the American public such as lower gas 
prices due to oil market saturation, or job growth from entities 
increasing oil production. As previous EPCA exceptions and al-
lowances led to significant oil exports, increasing export levels 
now likely follows that trend while not exacerbating potential 
 
 75. See Clayton, supra note 41 (―Letting drillers reap extra profits from 
selling crude oil overseas, if the market dictates, would provide greater incen-
tives for drilling, stimulating new supply. It would also encourage investment 
in oil and gas production in the United States rather than abroad.‖). 
 76. See id. (discussing U.S. reliance on foreign oil and potential interna-
tional emergencies threatening U.S. oil levels).  
 77. See id. (―It would demonstrate Washington‘s commitment to free and 
fair trade, even in a politically sensitive sector, bolstering its negotiating posi-
tion on other trade issues.‖). Yet, such influence relies heavily on the price of 
oil. With low oil prices, international power and influence based on the sale of 
oil drastically decreases. See, e.g., Tim Bowler, Falling Oil Prices: Who Are the 
Winners and Losers?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
business-29643612 (analyzing how the recent fall in global oil prices led to 
significant revenue problems in oil-exporting nations).  
 78. See Clayton, supra note 41. 
 79. See id. (―It would also avoid putting Washington at odds with allies 
that would like to source their oil from the United States.‖). 
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negative effects such as loss of strategic oil reserves. In addi-
tion, with much of the oil boom‘s production being light crude 
and thus domestically unusable, the U.S. needs foreign oil sales 
in order to take advantage of this newfound and non-essential 
resource. Finally, increasing American oil exports could im-
prove American trade influence amongst foreign entities and 
allies by making it a significant oil seller. With such benefits in 
hand, the federal government should consider lifting or modify-
ing the EPCA export ban.  
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LIFTING THE EPCA EXPORT BAN 
Although lifting the EPCA export ban could substantially 
benefit Americans, export detractors highlight multiple argu-
ments that oppose amending the EPCA‘s current provisions to 
permit more oil exports. Increasing exports may lead to nega-
tive economic effects such as increased domestic oil and gas 
prices, enhanced production reliance on unstable and unrelia-
ble fracking technology, elevated water and air pollution con-
cerns, and augmented threats to U.S. energy security. Addi-
tionally, it could be argued that the recent oil boom does not 
necessitate a revision of the EPCA because American producers 
export a sufficient amount through current exceptions. Due to 
such concerns and arguments, the federal government holds 
multiple valid reasons for continuing the export ban and limit-
ing the sale of domestically produced oil abroad.  
1. Increasing Exports Potentially Raises Domestic Oil and Gas  
Prices  
Increasing U.S. oil exports could create negative implica-
tions for the nation as a whole. Most importantly, allowing in-
creased oil exports may raise domestic oil and gasoline prices 
instead of lowering them.80 Contrary to the economic advantage 
arguments highlighted in Part II.A.1, this negative side effect 
could arise due to the fact that U.S. oil producers must raise 
currently low domestic oil prices (kept artificially lower than 
global prices due to significant domestic caches of oil from the 
oil boom) to global market prices in order to sell this oil 
abroad.81 With domestic oil prices at global levels, U.S. gasoline 
 
 80. See Schor, supra note 10 (―With all of the increased production coming 
from controversial fracking techniques, lifting the ban not only would raise 
gasoline prices for U.S. families, but would create bigger environmental head-
aches.‖). 
 81. See Letter from Robert Menendez to Barack Obama, supra note 9 
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prices would likely rise due to the higher cost of gasoline‘s main 
ingredient, oil.82 Due to the likely rise in domestic oil and gaso-
line prices, parties against increasing exports argue that keep-
ing domestically produced oil within the U.S. saves Americans‘ 
money by reducing gas pump prices and the cost of other oil-
based products made in the U.S.83  
2. The Unreliability of Hydraulic Fracturing Threatens the  
Viability of Increased Exports 
Also, long-term estimates of American oil production re-
main uncertain because of the world‘s lack of knowledge re-
garding hydraulic fracturing.84 With the U.S. holding only a 
few years of fracking experience, analysts such as British Pe-
troleum‘s chief economist Christopher Ruhl warn of the over-
statement of American oil reserve projections.85 Even though 
initial flows from fracking may be great, as witnessed in the oil 
boom, such flows quickly dissipate and lead producers to con-
tinue producing at decreased levels or abandon the well to drill 
another.86 California presents an irksome example of such 
fracking uncertainty after the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration‘s recent cutting of its estimate of recoverable oil in 
California‘s Monterey shale by 96%.87 Due to this oil production 
 
(―[T]he world price of oil (otherwise known as the Brent crude price) is cur-
rently about $110 per barrel, while the American price is about $97 per bar-
rel. The threshold question then, is why would we want to export oil and raise 
American oil prices to match the world‘s oil price?‖). But see Energy & Oil, 
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/energy (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
(showing the Brent crude oil price to be $48.98).  
 82. See Schor, supra note 10 (―[O]pponents argue that . . . allowing over-
seas crude sales . . . would drive up costs for consumers at the pump.‖). 
 83. See id.  
 84. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 9 (―[T]he vast majority of tight oil 
wells have only been producing for one or two years, so there is little data up-
on which to base estimates of their ultimate performance.‖). 
 85. See id. (―BP‘s chief economist Christopher Ruhl told delegates that 
among some tight oil proponents there is a lot of ‗. . . irrational exuberance or 
hype, these are the same consultants that three years ago were running 
around saying that we are running out of oil. Now they are saying that we are 
drowning in it because they have something to sell.‘‖). 
 86. See id. at 10 (―Initial flows of oil can be very strong at tight oil wells 
but this does not last and after several rounds of fracturing, wells are then left 
to produce at low levels and the drilling and fracking crews move on. This 
means that to maintain production at high levels drilling and fracking has to 
be maintained at a frenzied pace.‖). 
 87. See Eric McAllister, U.S. EIA Cuts Recoverable Monterey Shale Oil 
Estimate by 96 Pct, REUTERS (May 21, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2014/05/21/eia-monterey-shale-idUSL1N0O713N20140521 (―The 
reserves were downgraded by 96 percent, from 13.7 billion barrels estimated 
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uncertainty, allowing exports could cause negative effects such 
as producers‘ inability to meet domestic demands through de-
pleted or unproductive wells or job loss from decreased produc-
tion.88  
3. Increasing Exports Presents Water and Air Pollution Risks 
Multiple environmental effects of enlarged oil production 
raise concerns regarding the soundness of lifting the EPCA ban 
and increasing exports. First, escalating exports, and conse-
quently increasing production, may impose significant stress on 
domestic water supplies required for hydraulic fracturing.89 In 
Texas alone, fracking accounts for more than 20% of state wa-
ter consumption, producing 290 million barrels of non-
recyclable wastewater per month.90 Second, the process could 
negatively affect underground and surface water supplies 
through oil spills, faulty well construction, and the discharge of 
wastewater into clean water sources.91 Although states such as 
North Dakota require companies to report oil spills, reported 
numbers tend to be inaccurate, while states fail to monitor and 
regulate these reports.92 Due to enhanced oil production via 
fracking, the U.S. risks turning even more significant shares of 
American water into unusable wastewater by committing it to 
 
by a government-funded report in 2011, to just 600 million barrels . . . .‖).  
 88. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 10.  
 89. See id. at 19. 
 90. Id. (discussing Texas water use in hydraulic fracturing); see also Kate 
Galbraith, In Texas, Recycling Oilfield Water Has Far To Go, STATEIMPACT 
(Mar. 19, 2013, 8:58 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/03/19/in-texas 
-recycling-oilfield-water-has-far-to-go (discussing Texas procedures for frack-
ing water recycling and disposal).  
 91. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 19; Nicholas Kusnetz, North Dako-
ta’s Oil Boom Brings Damage Along with Prosperity, PROPUBLICA (June 7, 
2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-other-fracking-north 
-dakotas-oil-boom-brings-damage-along-with-prosperi (―[O]il companies in 
North Dakota reported more than 1,000 accidental releases of oil, drilling 
wastewater or other fluids in 2011, about as many as in the previous two years 
combined. Many more illicit releases went unreported, state regulators 
acknowledge, when companies dumped truckloads of toxic fluid along the road 
or drained waste pits illegally.‖).  
 92. See Kusnetz, supra note 91 (―Companies are supposed to report spill 
volumes, but officials acknowledge the numbers are often inexact or flat-out 
wrong. In 40 cases last year, the company responsible didn‘t know how much 
had spilled so it simply listed the volume of fluid as zero.‖); id. (―Under North 
Dakota regulations, the agencies that oversee drilling and water safety can 
sanction companies that dump or spill waste, but they seldom do: They have 
issued fewer than 50 disciplinary actions for all types of drilling violations, in-
cluding spills, over the past three years.‖). 
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production or through polluting discharges or spills.  
In addition to water issues, raising oil production may con-
tribute to climate change and increased pollution emissions. 
Some research shows that fracturing practices of injecting wa-
ter into the ground for disposal and to crack open rocks may in-
duce earthquakes by increasing pressure on geological faults.93 
Although it remains uncertain how these injections of water in-
to underground reservoirs increase the chances of earthquakes, 
amplified fluid pressure could ―critically load[]‖ nearby faults 
and make them vulnerable to even weak seismic activity.94 Due 
to such potentially critical effects of producing oil through 
fracking, the U.S. must seriously consider whether the benefits 
of enlarged oil supplies outweigh such climate concerns. 
Raising production may additionally impair U.S. efforts to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions. Some researchers conclude 
that, between now and 2050, ―only 20 to 25 percent of global 
proven oil reserves can be consumed . . . to have an 80 percent 
chance of avoiding devastating climatic changes.‖95 Methane 
gas emitted through the flaring of oil wells and other parts of 
the oil production, refinement, transportation, and storage pro-
cess constitutes the largest source of emissions.96 With frack-
ing-produced oil not included within these proven oil reserves, 
the exploitation of that oil may exacerbate current plans for 
limiting negative oil use effects like emissions.97 Also, as frack-
ing and other technologies present a completely new source of 
oil, no effective national or international system exists to regu-
late this oil or its environmental effects.98 Finally, raising pro-
duction also could create less of an incentive for the American 
 
 93. See Ker Than, Fracking Wastewater Disposal Linked to Remotely 
Triggered Quakes, NAT‘L GEOGRAPHIC (July 12, 2013), http://news.national 
geographic.com/news/energy/2013/07/130711-fracking-wastewater-injection 
-earthquakes (exploring the role of fracking water use and disposal in trigger-
ing earthquakes).  
 94. Id. (discussing possible ways in which increased fluid pressure from 
fracking causes earthquakes).  
 95. STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 4. 
 96. See Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/ cli-
matechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2015) 
(providing statistics on methane emissions within the United States); see also 
Joby Warrick, Methane Plume over Western US Illustrates Climate Cost of Gas 
Leaks, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2015/jan/04/leaking-methane-gas-plume-us (―Methane accounts for about 9% 
of US greenhouse gas emissions, and the biggest single source of it—nearly 
30%—is the oil and gas industry . . . .‖). 
 97. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 4. 
 98. See id. at 17.  
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public to limit oil consumption in favor of renewable fuels and 
clean energy uses.99 Without a system monitoring these effects, 
allowing more U.S. exports could aggravate current or future 
climate issues.100  
4. Increasing Exports Endangers American Oil Security 
Building upon these environmental reasons for not lifting 
the EPCA export ban, detractors argue that domestically pro-
duced oil should be utilized to fulfill the statute‘s goal of Ameri-
can energy security.101 For one, it remains unclear whether 
light crude production will actually exceed American refining 
capacity.102 If domestic refineries adequately accommodate U.S. 
light crude production, no need exists to send that oil abroad in 
place of fulfilling American purposes. Even if U.S. refineries 
cannot presently utilize all domestically produced light crude, 
detractors contend that refineries could be inexpensively modi-
fied and thus keep the oil within the U.S.103  
Secondly, keeping domestically produced oil for American 
purposes may allow the U.S. to reduce its reliance on foreign oil 
imports.104 As of 2012, Persian Gulf nations supplied approxi-
 
 99. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 8 
(Mar. 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/  
reports/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf (―Without government intervention, 
environmental costs are not reflected in the prices charged for various fuels 
and energy services, so firms and households lack an incentive to take them 
into account when deciding what types and quantity of energy to produce and 
consume.‖). 
 100. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 17 (―Exporting tight oil would help 
producers pull more of the resource out of the ground, making it even more 
difficult to keep within climate limits. Without an effective international re-
gime to keep global greenhouse gas emissions below recognized thresholds, 
deregulating U.S. crude oil exports can only exacerbate the impending climate 
crisis.‖). Proponents of hydraulic fracturing and lifting the EPCA ban counter 
these environmental arguments by claiming present and prudent regulations 
capably manage these environmental side effects. See Clayton, supra note 41. 
 101. See Ford, supra note 1 (describing the EPCA‘s purposes); Letter from 
Robert Menendez to Barack Obama, supra note 9 (―When Congress first en-
acted limits on crude exports in the 1970s following the oil embargo, these 
laws were designed to enhance American energy security and protect U.S. 
consumers from volatility and price spikes.‖).  
 102. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 31. 
 103. See id. (―Refiners and producers can invest in relatively inexpensive 
‗splitters‘ that parse condensates into products that can be exported without a 
license.‖). But see id. (discussing how exports to Canada or exploitation of 
loopholes in the export license process could be viable options to get rid of ex-
cess American oil).  
 104. See How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
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mately 29% of U.S. petroleum products, while Canada and 
Saudi Arabia constituted the largest sources of imported crude 
oil.105 With many of these trade partners experiencing periods 
of instability, the federal government decreases the probability 
of repeating the 1973 oil crisis by cutting oil imports.106 Over-
all, the U.S. imports approximately 8 million barrels per day 
while producing just 7 million barrels per day.107 Due to this 
potential American ability to reduce foreign oil reliance 
through growing domestic production, this argument presents a 
valid reason against lifting the export ban and going against its 
goal of protecting American interests from overseas market 
volatility.  
5. Current EPCA Export Exceptions May Provide for  
Sufficient Oil Exports 
The ability of American oil producers to utilize current 
EPCA export exceptions provides an additional ground for 
maintaining the status quo. Currently, the BIS approves export 
applications for limited transactions from Alaska‘s Cook Inlet 
and up to 25,000 barrels per day from California oil fields.108 
With an average export level of 35,000 barrels per day from 
2003 to 2012, it appears that American producers already hold 
substantial amounts of export capabilities.109 When combined 
with the fact that the U.S. still maintains an oil import-export 
deficit,110 the argument can be made that the federal govern-
ment should not allow American oil producers any greater ex-
ceptions to the EPCA in order to utilize newly produced re-
serves at home. 
Within the EPCA export ban issue, multiple arguments ex-
ist undermining the position of allowing greater levels of Amer-
ican oil exports. First, sending more oil abroad may actually 
lead to higher oil and gas prices by raising low U.S. oil prices to 
higher global rates. Second, the volatile nature of the light 
 
MIN. (May 10, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/foreign_oil_ 
dependence.cfm (―[I]ncreased use of domestic biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel), 
and strong gains in domestic production of crude oil and natural gas plant liq-
uids expanded domestic supplies and reduced the need for imports.‖). 
 105. Id.  
 106. See id. (identifying Persian Gulf countries exporting oil to the U.S.).  
 107. January 2013 Crude Oil Export to China Was a Rare Event, supra 
note 30. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See supra Part II.B.4. 
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crude that constitutes most of the oil boom‘s production ques-
tions that production‘s longevity and consequent job creation. 
Third, increased exports place great stress on the environment 
and climate through emissions, water discharges, and geologi-
cal faults, questioning export practicality. Fourth, increasing 
exports may put U.S. energy security at risk by not modifying 
U.S. refineries to utilize domestic oil and maintaining Ameri-
can dependence on oil from potentially unstable nations. Final-
ly, with export exceptions already allowing significant amounts 
of oil exports, the federal government does not need to grant 
additional exceptions. Due to these arguments, the federal gov-
ernment finds legitimate grounds for not lifting or modifying 
the EPCA export ban. 
C. POTENTIAL EPCA EXPORT ISSUE SOLUTIONS 
The federal government may pursue multiple avenues to 
resolve the EPCA export issue. These avenues include execu-
tive-agency action, congressional action, or simply staying with 
the status quo of EPCA regulations and exceptions. Under the 
EPCA, the executive branch could find compelling economic or 
technological reasons why new stores of light crude cannot rea-
sonably be marketed in the U.S., consequently approving more 
exports in response to increased U.S. oil production.111 The ar-
guments mentioned in Part II.A present examples of such an 
agency interpretation, such as decreasing global oil and gas 
prices or profiting from domestically unusable oil.112 As such 
findings would technically fall under the present provisions of 
the EPCA, this agency interpretation simply expands previous 
elucidations like Alaskan or Californian oil exports to foreign 
countries.113 After this expansion, U.S. oil producers need to fol-
low administrative procedures and stay within the parameters 
of the new executive branch interpretation before exporting 
newly produced oil.114  
 
 111. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b)(2)(i)(C) (2015); Plumer, supra note 54 (―First, the 
Obama administration could act on its own. The law allows the Commerce De-
partment to approve exports if there are ‗compelling economic or technological 
reasons . . . .‘‖). But see Letter from Edward Markey and Robert Menendez to 
Barack Obama, supra note 10 (claiming that ―compelling economic or techno-
logical reasons‖ applies to swaps of oil or technology, not actual exports). 
 112. For more detailed analyses of these compelling arguments for allowing 
exports, see supra Part II.A. 
 113. For further information on U.S. oil exports to Canada and other for-
eign nations, see supra Part II.A.  
 114. See, e.g., Schor, supra note 10 (―An administration could set up licens-
ing rules for the Commerce Department to approve exports so long as the re-
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In place of the President reinterpreting EPCA provisions, 
the BIS could change export license criteria and allow for more 
or fewer exports.115 Under the EPCA the President and the rest 
of the Executive Branch establish criteria for exports, similar to 
the finding of compelling economic or technological reasons.116 
By adopting this solution, the BIS would consider other factors 
in addition to previously mentioned procedural requirements 
before granting a license to a producer.117 Such factors could in-
clude the availability of crude oil for domestic purposes, the 
quality and characteristics of produced crude, the design of 
American refineries, and the abilities of the U.S. oil production, 
transportation, and trade infrastructures.118 These additional 
guidelines further scrutinize potential exports, allowing them if 
they follow these substantial regulations or preventing them 
altogether by making it too difficult for producers to trade oil 
abroad.119  
In lieu of executive action, the U.S. Congress could repeal 
or amend the EPCA to allow for more oil exports or to reduce 
export levels.120 As Congress enacted the EPCA, it holds the 
power to alter it in any way it sees fit.121 If wishing to increase 
 
cipients of domestic crude held free trade agreements with the United States, 
similar to the standard currently in place for DOE approval of LNG export ap-
plications . . . .‖).  
 115. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (exploring how the executive branch could 
change administrative licensing practices to modify the EPCA export ban).  
 116. Id.; see also Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 
(2015) (delegating authority to the BIS to control export activities).  
 117. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (―Mechanically, given the president‘s au-
thority, guidelines or criteria for exports could be established . . . .‖). For anal-
ysis of BIS export license determinations, see supra Part I.A.  
 118. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (exploring potential executive guidelines 
or criteria for changing oil export levels).  
 119. For a brief overview of executive avenues for changing export re-
strictions, see JASON BORDOFF, U.S. CRUDE OIL EXPORT POLICY 19 (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/conference/2014/pdf/presentations/bordoff.pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., LISA MURKOWSKI, A SIGNAL TO THE WORLD: RENOVATING 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF U.S. ENERGY EXPORTS 14–15 (2014) (―If the White 
House disagrees with this interpretation of its authority and/or chooses to 
maintain the prohibition on exports, then the Senate should update the law to 
reflect 21[st]-century conditions.‖); see also Ladislaw, supra note 57 (describing 
possible congressional actions regarding the EPCA export ban); Schor, supra 
note 10 (―Sen. Mary Landrieu . . . did not rule out eventual congressional in-
volvement.‖). 
 121. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2012); WIL-
LIAM C. LANE, JR., THE MANDATORY PETROLEUM PRICE AND ALLOCATION 
REGULATIONS A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 57 (1981) (―[N]early all of these 
changes were in response to pleas for relief from particular industry groups, or 
political pressures from the Congress.‖); McCabe, supra note 12, at 182 (―Dur-
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exports, Congress could partially or fully repeal export re-
strictions.122 A limited repeal permits selected exports from 
U.S. producers in the Outer Continental Shelf or Alaska,123 re-
laxes BIS export license criteria and consequently simplifies 
export procedures,124 or authorizes exports up to congressional-
ly set amounts.125 Such limited EPCA changes fall within exec-
utive branch and congressional intentions of easing export re-
strictions if they do not hurt EPCA purposes.126 In contrast, a 
full repeal completely negates the EPCA export ban and allows 
for any oil exports fulfilling other relevant regulations.127 
These executive and congressional options for solving the 
EPCA export issue hold some benefits over other alternatives, 
as well as certain detriments. For instance, a BIS finding of 
compelling economic or technological reasons, or changing BIS 
license criteria, present more expedient and easily completed 
options than congressional action.128 Such expediency occurs 
due to the circumvention of the potentially cumbersome legisla-
tive process by using administrative practices.129 Yet, any 
changes stemming from administrative instead of legislative 
methods may prove less substantial than congressional action 
 
ing the subsequent Ford Administration, in 1975, Congress enacted the Ener-
gy Conservation and Production Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act.‖). 
 122. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (―Possible congressional action ranges 
from partial, selective repeals of some of the molecule laws—perhaps allowing 
unrestricted exports of U.S. crude produced on the Outer Continental Shelf, or 
revising the Mineral Leasing Act . . . .‖). 
 123. See Ford, supra note 1 (―But over time, this legislation removes con-
trols and should give industry sufficient incentive to explore, develop, and 
produce new fields in the Outer Continental Shelf, Alaska, and potential new 
reserves in the lower 48 States.‖). 
 124. For information on current BIS export regulations, see supra Part I.A. 
 125. These export allowances would resemble recent executive rulings 
permitting ultralight oil sales to foreign entities. See Berthelsen & Cook, su-
pra note 11 (describing rulings); Ladislaw, supra note 57 (noting possibility of 
congressional re-examination). 
 126. See Ford, supra note 1 (―[T]his legislation removes controls . . . . I do 
not expect the Congress to stand in the way of such actions.‖). 
 127. See Ladislaw, supra note 57. 
 128. See, e.g., Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 824 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (discussing the quick character of executive action within EPCA 
regulations). For an example of an executive action, see McCabe, supra note 
12, at 187–88 (discussing executive moratoriums on oil production in the Out-
er Continental Shelf). 
 129. See Carmen, 669 F.2d at 823 (―[T]he EPCA empowers the President ‗to 
respond quickly to energy supply interruptions or other energy crises.‘‖ (quot-
ing Brief for Appellee at 28, id. (No. 81-2144))). 
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due to administrative methods‘ lack of democratic process.130 
Also, an incoming President can more easily reverse a BIS ac-
tion than congressional action.131 However, although congres-
sional modification of the EPCA may prove more substantial 
and harder to reverse, its prospects remain unlikely due to the 
political obstacles inherent within the legislative process.132 
Instead of executive or legislative action, the federal gov-
ernment could simply stick with the status quo to solve the ex-
port issue.133 As of now, current EPCA regulations present a 
compromise between export supporters and detractors. Follow-
ing recent energy trends leading to nearly historic export lev-
els, by doing nothing the federal government would allow 
American producers and society to profit from light crude while 
not increasing environmental or security issues.134 To maintain 
such oil sales, Congress need only preserve current levels of ex-
port licensing and exceptions for oil trading between the U.S. 
and countries like Canada.135 In addition, domestic crude prices 
would probably continue at depressed levels, as exports would 
be restricted and thus not need to be sold at foreign market 
prices.136  
 
 130. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 31, at 27 (―The most determinative 
means by which to accomplish this would arguably be the amendment or re-
peal of the current language in EPCA . . . .‖); see also id. (―[I]t appears that 
BIS could not repeal the regulations entirely. As with all agencies, BIS cannot 
take any action beyond the scope of the statutory authority granted to it by 
Congress.‖). 
 131. See id. (―The President could reverse those directives via another ex-
ecutive order, or opt to not issue a new order when the current one expires.‖); 
Plumer, supra note 54 (―[T]he American Petroleum Institute would prefer a 
legislative fix than ‗ad hoc‘ tweaks by the Commerce Department that could be 
easily reversed.‖).  
 132. See BORDOFF, supra note 119, at 20. But cf. Plumer, supra note 54 
(―[A] re-examination is steadily getting more and more support in Congress.‖).  
 133. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (listing the status quo as a possibility for 
solving the export ban issue).  
 134. See U.S. Exports of Crude Oil (Thousand Barrels per Day), U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/ 
LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCREXUS2&f=M (showing the variations in 
U.S. crude oil exports from 1920–2015).  
 135. See Ladislaw, supra note 57. For information on current licensing lev-
els, see Memorandum on Export Licenses, supra note 30, at 1 (―According to 
BIS data supplied to your office, between fiscal year 2008 (10/2007–9/2008) 
and August 2013, 338 export license applications have been received by BIS of 
which 304 have been approved.‖); see also supra Part I.B (exploring multiple 
EPCA exceptions providing for the sale of U.S. oil abroad).  
 136. See Ladislaw, supra note 57 (―In the near term, U.S. crude prices will 
likely stay depressed . . . .‖); see also Letter from Robert Menendez to Barack 
Obama, supra note 9 (―[W]hy would we want to export oil and raise American 
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Although the status quo does not exacerbate environmen-
tal or security issues and allows for some oil exports, this solu-
tion does not truly solve the export issue. Maintaining present 
export levels and regulations cultivates the export issue instead 
of ending it by neither favoring a debating side nor creating a 
definite compromise. As illustrated earlier, increased oil pro-
duction causes interested parties to clamor for limiting or ex-
panding the use of this now abundant resource, not preserving 
the status quo.137 Therefore, in place of inaction that provides 
no clear answer for how to deal with increased American oil 
supplies, the federal government should definitively act to solve 
this export issue.  
III.  PROPOSING A SOLUTION TO THE EXPORT ISSUE   
The continuance and gravity of the problems associated 
with the EPCA export ban generate the need for a considered 
solution. Part III provides such a resolution, balancing both the 
desires of American oil producers and other export advocates 
with the concerns of export detractors such as environmental-
ists or isolationists. Section A presents a solution advocating 
for the President to designate light crude oil exports to be with-
in the national interest and thus allowed. Section B highlights 
the benefits of a presidential national interest determination. 
Section C provides countermeasures against negative environ-
mental and technological effects of increasing exports by re-
quiring exporters to meet fixed funding levels for renewable 
energy projects and environmental sustainability standards. 
A. PROPOSED EPCA EXPORT ISSUE SOLUTION 
In order to effectively end the export issue, this Note pro-
poses an executive-based solution providing for increased oil 
exports coupled with improved guidelines counteracting nega-
tive export effects. Specifically, the President should declare 
that the EPCA export ban runs counter to the national interest. 
As this declaration would increase exports, the President 
should correspondingly set further licensing rules requiring ex-
porters to supply fixed funding levels for renewable energy pro-
jects and meet environmental sustainability standards. Addi-
tionally, to minimize U.S. security risks, the federal 
government should support the modification or creation of 
American refineries to process light crude for domestic benefit. 
 
oil prices to match the world‘s oil price?‖). 
 137. For analysis of the debating sides‘ arguments, see supra Part II.  
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Overall, this solution exploits increased and domestically un-
usable American oil supplies through flexible and timely execu-
tive action. Yet, this resolution also fulfills the EPCA‘s security 
goals while ensuring the development of sustainable energy re-
sources and practices needed for fuel and industry once U.S. oil 
sources dwindle.  
B. THE BENEFITS OF AN EXECUTIVE NATIONAL INTEREST  
DETERMINATION 
An executive determination finding that exports fall within 
the national interest proves to be the best solution to the EPCA 
export ban issue for multiple reasons. First, the EPCA and oth-
er U.S. laws explicitly recognize that the President may exempt 
oil exports from the ban with few limits. Second, a national in-
terest determination offers distinct advantages over other solu-
tions, including expediency and past successes. Third, this de-
termination readily meets EPCA requirements and purposes. 
With these advantages in hand, an executive national interest 
determination presents the best option for putting the EPCA 
export issue to rest.  
As previously mentioned, under the EPCA the President 
holds the power to exempt certain oil exports from prohibition 
if he determines them ―to be consistent with the national inter-
est.‖138 Within the EPCA and subsequent U.S. law, few re-
strictions apply to this determinative power. For instance, the 
EPCA states only that the President must ―take into account‖ 
the need to maintain current trade levels and foreign relations 
before changing export amounts.139 Other laws require a na-
tional interest determination to consider whether exports di-
minish the quantity or quality of oil available for domestic uses, 
affect oil prices, or result in adverse environmental effects.140 
Fulfilling these minimal and accommodating standards, execu-
tives previously used national interest determinations to au-
thorize EPCA exports from Alaska and California.141  
 
 138. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6212(b)(1) (2012). 
 139. Id. §§ 6212(d)(1)–(3).  
 140. E.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(s)(1)(A)–(C) (2012) (listing factors the President 
must consider).  
 141. BORDOFF, supra note 119, at 23 (briefly discussing presidential power 
to lift the export ban); Clinton Lifts Ban on Alaskan Oil Exports, supra note 48 
(chronicling President Clinton‘s lifting of the Alaskan oil ban in 1996); Irwin, 
supra note 70 (―A national interest determination has been made in the past 
for certain exceptions, including exports from Alaska‘s Cook Inlet, and to Can-
ada, or exports of Alaska North Slope and California heavy crude . . . .‖). 
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Presidential action presents many benefits that congres-
sional avenues do not for changing the EPCA. The greatest ad-
vantage that an executive determination of national interest 
has over congressional action remains that it presents a quick-
er and more focused way to change the law than the burden-
some legislative process.142 Such expedient process fits within 
the purposes of the EPCA, which allows the President to up-
date export regulations in quick response to any situation that 
arises.143 The advantage of a national interest determination in 
place of another form of executive action lies in its previously 
proven viability. Previous national interest determinations al-
lowed for greater amounts of exports from production areas 
such as the Outer Continental Shelf.144 Finally, EPCA and ex-
port regulation goals promote the changing of the regulations 
to reflect transformations in national and global realities.145 In 
response to the recent oil boom,146 an executive interpretation 
of the national interest favoring increased exports reflects new 
energy realities within the U.S. and thus fulfills the rationale 
behind the EPCA.147  
Due to the determinative flexibility infused within EPCA 
export regulations, the executive easily meets the requirements 
 
 142. See supra Part III.A. BIS determinations also offer case-by-case re-
view in order to provide focused export decisions. Export Administration Regu-
lation, 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b)(2) (2015); BROWN ET AL., supra note 31, at 27 (―BIS 
could approve more applications to export crude oil pursuant to the ‗case by 
case‘ review authorized by 15 C.F.R. §754.2(b)(2).‖). 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 6212(b) (authorizing presidential determination power); 
Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dis-
cussing the response powers of the President under the EPCA).  
 144. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1354(b) 
(2012) (―[T]he President shall make and publish an express finding that such 
exports . . . are in the national interest.‖); Irwin, supra note 70 (―A national 
interest determination has been made in the past for certain exceptions, in-
cluding exports from Alaska‘s Cook Inlet, and to Canada, or exports of Alaska 
North Slope and California heavy crude.‖). 
 145. Mission Statement, supra note 25 (―Bureau activities and regulations 
can only be justified, and should only be maintained, to the extent they reflect 
current global realities. Laws, regulations, or practices that do not take into 
account these realities—and that do not have sufficient flexibility to allow for 
adaptation in response to future changes—ultimately harm national security 
 . . . .‖); see also Ford, supra note 1 (discussing the intentions of the EPCA to 
eventually deregulate oil exports).  
 146. For information on the energy situation facing the U.S., see supra 
Part I.B.  
 147. See Mission Statement, supra note 25; see also 121 CONG. REC. 9692 
(1975) (statement of Sen. Bellmon) (―The President does not need power ex-
tending over 2 years in the future to control prices and allocate petroleum 
products, allocate material and prohibit exports.‖). 
ANDRE_4fmt 1/3/2016 1:06 PM 
2015] STRIKING BEFORE THE WELL GOES DRY 791 
 
of this standard when opening American exports in response to 
the oil boom.148 Such ease consequently makes this solution a 
better option for allowing more exports than previously men-
tioned alternatives. First, raising present export levels in order 
to utilize domestically unusable crude oil does not affect cur-
rent trade levels.149 As the oil boom raises domestic supplies, 
substantial oil supplies for both foreign relation purposes and 
increased exports remain.150  
Second, as previously mentioned, light crude constitutes 
much of the extra oil being produced.151 With light crude being 
largely unusable for domestic purposes,152 allowing this product 
to be exported would not diminish the quality or quantity of 
domestically needed oil. Finally, even though increased exports 
affect oil prices, these effects likely lead to lower oil prices by 
causing a saturation of the global oil market.153 Exporting oil 
boom products does necessitate raising depreciated domestic oil 
prices, initially costing American society.154 Yet, as the U.S. 
imports considerable amounts of foreign oil, the savings from 
saturating the market may outweigh initial costs over time.155 
 
 148. See Ford, supra note 1 (―I fully intend to use the flexibility which is 
granted to me by this legislation to expedite the decontrol of crude oil in order 
to increase domestic production.‖); Schor, supra note 10. 
 149. For the text of that regulation, see 42 U.S.C §§ 6212(d)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 150. Compare Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 
2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm (8.713 
million barrels of oil produced per day in the U.S. in 2014), with Exports by 
Destination, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/ 
dnav/pet/pet_move_expc_a_EPC0_EEX_mbblpd_a.htm (331,000 barrels of oil 
exported to Canada per day in 2014).  
 151. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the type of oil produced during the re-
cent oil boom).  
 152. See Clayton, supra note 41 (―Much of the country‘s rapidly growing 
production of light crude oil, including lease condensates (i.e., ultra-light oil), 
comes from either areas where refiners are not interested in or able to process 
it . . . .‖). 
 153. For a discussion of oil price changes, see Snyder, supra note 8; see also 
Clayton, supra note 41. 
 154. See Schor, supra note 10 (―[L]ifting the ban . . . would raise gasoline 
prices for U.S. families . . . .‖); Snyder, supra note 8 (―Keeping more oil in the 
U.S. would inevitably lower gasoline costs . . . .‖). 
 155. See U.S. Imports by Country of Origin, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_ 
im0_mbblpd_a.htm (showing the U.S. imported 9.859 million barrels of oil per 
day in 2013). The loss of investment in oil production due to artificially low oil 
prices making production unprofitable presents an additional argument 
against such practices. Clayton, supra note 41 (―These artificially low prices 
slow additional U.S. crude oil production.‖); Ladislaw, supra note 57 (―[T]he 
export ban risks jeopardizing production by artificially lowering prices in the 
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A presidential national interest determination includes the 
same disadvantages of executive branch action as previously 
discussed with BIS determinations. A presidential act likely 
holds less weight than congressional action due to its lack of 
democratic process.156 Also, presidential actions tend to be lim-
ited in length and easily overturned by a subsequent Presi-
dent.157 However, with oil production reaching near historical 
heights, producers need immediate action in order to capitalize 
on this oil boom instead of lengthy legislative action or govern-
ment inaction.158 Thus, the expediency, legality, and proven ef-
fectiveness of a presidential determination provide a more im-
mediate benefit than waiting for congressional action.159 Also, 
such a determination‘s straightforward ability to meet EPCA 
exception requirements makes it an ideal choice for increasing 
oil exports.160 Finally, the EPCA explicitly gives the President 
power to act, distinguishing this avenue from simple executive 
orders.161 Ultimately, a final legislative solution should be 
sought due to its more substantial and irreversible nature, but 
an executive determination fills the determination void until 
such a solution is reached.162 
C. ADDRESSING INCREASED EXPORT SHORTFALLS 
Unlike previously submitted answers to the EPCA export 
issue, this proposed solution recognizes and mitigates the nega-
tive side effects of increasing U.S. oil exports. For instance, 
raising export levels due to the oil boom, no matter the amount, 
 
United States. Lower prices will reduce the investment in new wells and re-
duce the growth . . . of future production . . . .‖). 
 156. See supra Part III.A (comparing executive to legislative action). 
 157. Supra Part III.A.  
 158. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the call for action by oil producers after 
the rise in oil production).  
 159. See Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815, 823 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (―[T]he EPCA empowers the President ‗to respond quickly to energy 
supply interruptions or other energy crises.‘‖ (quoting Brief for Appellee at 28, 
id. (No. 81-1244))). 
 160. See Ford, supra note 1; Schor, supra note 10. 
 161. See 42 U.S.C. § 6212(a)(1) (2012) (allowing the President to restrict 
exports of oil as deemed appropriate and necessary). 
 162. A national interest determination must also follow procedural re-
quirements. BROWN ET AL., supra note 31, at 27 (―In order to change the perti-
nent regulations, BIS would have to follow the rulemaking procedures under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.‖); id. (―As with all agencies, BIS cannot 
take any action beyond the scope of the statutory authority granted to it by 
Congress.‖). 
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increases the chances of environmental risks.163 Yet, this solu-
tion proves unique as it recognizes and addresses these envi-
ronmental issues. The federal government ensures that in-
creased oil production does not stunt renewable energy 
development by requiring exporters to fund renewable energy 
technologies, with funding levels based on the amount of oil the 
producer exported (the proportion to be set by Congress).164  
Renewable energy funding requirements support the crea-
tion of a parallel renewable energy industry growing each time 
that a producer desires to begin or increase oil exports. Alt-
hough increased oil supplies may fulfill U.S. energy needs for 
the immediate future, the unpredictable and polluted nature of 
fracking necessitates a clean energy alternative.165 The U.S. 
gains the opportunity to provide such an alternative, and thus 
aid the environment, through substantial funding require-
ments for the exporters making increased export profits at 
global market prices.166 Such requirements may lead to back-
lash from both export supporters and detractors for being too 
restrictive or too weak of a limitation on exports, but they pre-
sent a compromising position within the EPCA issue by chang-
ing both exports and renewable energy levels from the status 
quo. Also, congressional participation in the setting of funding 
levels allows for the debating sides to present their cases for 
higher or lower funding amounts.  
Along with support for renewable energies, under this so-
lution exporters must also meet federally set environmental 
sustainability standards. Monitored by the executive branch, 
violations of these standards will result in significant sanctions 
 
 163. See, e.g., Jillian L. Genaw, Offshore Oil Drilling in the United States 
and the Expansion of Cuba’s Oil Program: A Discussion of Environmental Pol-
icy, 20 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 60 (2010) (―Environmentalists argue 
that we cannot allow offshore drilling near our coastlines because it would be 
detrimental to coastal ecosystems and tourism.‖); Schor, supra note 10 (―[A]ll 
of the increased production coming from controversial fracking techniques . . . 
would create bigger environmental headaches.‖). 
 164. Members of the U.S. Congress attempted to balance increased offshore 
oil production with environmental provisions such as tax credits for renewable 
energy. This attempt died in the House of Representatives. Comprehensive 
American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 6899, 110th 
Cong. (2008).  
 165. See STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 10. 
 166. See Genaw, supra note 163, at 71 (―[T]he ban can be lifted and off-
shore drilling can be coupled with aggressive renewable energy policies or spe-
cific types of drilling technology can be required. For example, the OMB rec-
ommends that Congress extend and improve existing renewable energy tax 
credits in addition to lifting the OCS Moratorium.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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for the producers.167 In order to ensure the effectiveness of the-
se fines, the penalty amount must be substantial to the produc-
er.168 Also, with weak sanctions previously proving to be a fee-
ble deterrent, combining extensive penalties with renewable 
energy funding likely constitutes a larger portion of producer 
profits and thus may instigate better environmental practic-
es.169 Other, more environmentally friendly nations successful-
ly produce significant oil without great issue by utilizing simi-
larly strong standards.170 Through the growth of renewable 
energy and strong sustainability standards, this solution coun-
teracts the negative effects of enlarged oil production and thus 
supports increasing exports. 
Building upon these environmental assurances, requiring 
federal support for the modification or creation of U.S. refiner-
ies fulfills the EPCA‘s energy security goal by increasing Amer-
ican light crude refining capacity while allowing increased ex-
ports.171 This refining capacity reallocates previously unusable 
light crude for domestic purposes, solving the issue of exporting 
oil capable of fulfilling U.S. needs.172 Nevertheless, with light 
crude production continuing to rise and refinery modification or 
building needing time for completion,173 producers presently 
 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 53 (―[I]n August of 2008, the EPA slapped Exxon Mobil 
with a 2.64 million dollar penalty after Exxon ignored a polychlorinated bi-
phenyl (―PCB‖) leak for two years.‖). 
 168. Id. at 54 (discussing how experts find small sanction amounts, such as 
one percent of the producer‘s quarterly profits, to be too low). 
 169. Id. at 73 (―[B]ecause oil companies often turn such great profits, im-
posing a fine on the companies may not serve as a strong enough deterrent.‖). 
 170. For an outline of the Norwegian environmental regulatory regime, see 
generally DAG ERLEND HENRIKSEN, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN THE 
NORWEGIAN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS BUSINESS 13–24 (2012), http://www 
.riela.org/pdfs/rio_2012/10-Dag%20Henriksen.pdf. See Genaw, supra note 163, 
at 70 (―Other nations, such as Canada and Norway, known for being far more 
environmentally friendly in comparison to the United States, allow offshore 
drilling.‖); Frank T. Manheim, U.S. Offshore Oil Industry: New Perspectives on 
an Old Conflict, GEOTIMES (Dec. 2004), http://www.geotimes.org/dec04/  
feature_Norway.html (―Norway has evolved toward integrated systems that 
foster continuously increasing standards and efficiency and an environmental-
ly aware public.‖). 
 171. See Ford, supra note 1; see also S. 622, 94th Cong. § 201(c) (as passed 
by Senate, Apr. 10, 1975) (―The Congress hereby declares that it is in the na-
tional interest for . . . the Federal Government to foster and promote compre-
hensive national fuels and energy conservation programs . . . to better assure 
adequate supplies of energy to consumers . . . .‖). 
 172. For analysis of this issue, see supra Part II.B. 
 173. See supra Part I.B (discussing the rise in U.S. light crude oil produc-
tion); supra Part II.A (analyzing the potential for exports of currently unusa-
ble light crude).  
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hold the opportunity to capitalize on increased exports before 
the diversion of oil to American refining. Ultimately, due to the 
prospect of greater oil sales to foreign and U.S. refineries, en-
larging both exports and domestic refining capacity likely leads 
to increased oil production.174 Consequently, this oil boom may 
provide sufficient product for additional exports and for U.S. 
needs, fulfilling the desires of producers to increase profits and 
the government‘s need to ensure oil security. 
Overall, this executive-based solution presents a reasona-
ble compromise between the arguments in favor of lifting the 
EPCA export ban and the fears of such an action‘s consequenc-
es. By determining extra exports to be within the national in-
terest, the executive utilizes an expedient and proven option for 
increasing U.S. export levels that also successfully passes regu-
latory requirements. However, with required renewable energy 
funding and strict adherence to sustainability standards, the 
federal government counteracts many of the increased envi-
ronmental effects from increases in oil exports and oil produc-
tion. Also, through support for increased American refining ca-
pacity, this solution both ensures American oil security by 
utilizing previously unusable oil while still allowing for exports 
from these new oil supplies. Therefore, although executive ac-
tion poses some drawbacks, the federal government should uti-
lize this solution, as it expediently solves the export issue and 
presents an evenhanded approach. 
 
  CONCLUSION   
After the 1973 Arab oil embargo significantly threatened 
U.S. energy security, the federal government passed the Ener-
gy Policy and Conservation Act. This law, seen as a necessary 
defense of American oil supplies, effectively banned U.S. oil ex-
ports without specific approval from the executive or legislative 
branches. Due to the recent and substantial rise in domestic 
production of light crude oil via technological innovations, the 
issue arose whether the federal government should lift this ex-
 
 174. See Ford, supra note 1 (stating that the deregulation of oil leads to in-
creased production); Schor, supra note 10 (―Because lifting the ban would 
cause U.S. benchmark oil prices to rise, companies likely would have a greater 
incentive to increase production . . . .‖ (quoting Press Release, Public Citizen, 
Retaining Ban on Crude Exports Good for Consumers, Climate (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=4052)). But see 
STOCKMAN, supra note 64, at 9 (arguing that oil boom production may not be 
sustainable).  
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port ban. Export proponents argue in favor of lifting the ban 
due to the amount of oil produced, its domestically unusable 
nature, and the amount of previously allowed exports. EPCA 
export ban supporters point to U.S. energy security, potential 
domestic uses, and environmental issues as reasons to main-
tain the ban‘s boundaries. Such differences in positions necessi-
tate a balanced solution appeasing both oil producers and ex-
port detractors.  
This Note proposes that the President determine new oil 
exports to be within the national interest, legally allowing in-
creased exports as they would not adversely affect the quality, 
quantity, or price of U.S. oil. However, this solution requires 
exporters to meet fixed funding levels for renewable energy pro-
jects and environmental sustainability requirements to coun-
teract any negative ecological effects of increased oil production 
and trade. Also, requiring federal support for the extension of 
U.S. refining capacity improves the utilization of oil for nation-
al purposes. While other executive or congressional alternatives 
may provide more significant and permanent effects on export 
capabilities, the flexibility, expediency, and prior effectiveness 
of this national interest determination make it a more reasona-
ble solution. Consequently, with continued growth in U.S. oil 
production necessitating federal action, an executive determi-
nation increasing exports (if meeting additional environmental 
standards) proves to be the most effective resolution to the EP-
CA export ban issue. 
 
